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Book Note
THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM, by Eric A. Posner 1
SIMON KUPI
TONES OF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT in the Obama administration's support for

UN Security Council Resolution 19732 on Libya provide the latest sign that a
convergence in official US and European attitudes toward international law-set
in stark relief during the unilateralist "Bush Doctrine" years-is occurring. But is a
new age of multilateralism, cooperation, and fidelity to aspirations of international legality any nearer, or is this all a desert mirage? In 7he Perils of Global
Legalism, Eric A. Posner-son of the influential jurist and law-and-economics
scholar Richard A. Posner-firmly rejects any cause for optimism. In Posner's
view, scholars of international law have been seduced by "global legalism"-an
enthusiasm for international law so blind to the inefficacy of its institutions that
not a theory grounded in a
it becomes "a faith, or set of assumptions, or attitude ...
plausible reading of the evidence." 3
In part I of the book, Posner proceeds by describing global legalism as a
last-ditch solution to international "collective-action problems" such as pollution,
overfishing, disease, and terror, which have proven insoluble by political, economic,
and ideological integration. The global-legalist camp, according to Posner, pushes for
international law's role in all interstate disputes; for the expansion of treaty-making
and of customary international law; for the grant of broad, compulsory jurisdiction to
international courts; and for international obligations that have binding domestic
effect. Yet global legalists provide little suggestion, he notes, of how these goals
can be reconciled with the rich-poor, democrat-autocrat, east-west dichotomies
of a diverse, multi-polar world.
In particular, Posner argues that the international system lacks rule-making
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Supra note I at 79.
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institutions beyond the limited mandate of the UN Security Council and the spontaneous treaty-making of states. Further, he suggests, international law's doctrines
are largely unenforceable, save on individual states' own terms. Posner surveys the
laundry list of international law violations by the leading world powers-from the
"illegal but legitimate" doctrine adopted in NATO'S Kosovo intervention to the
European Union's rows over genetically modified food. For Posner, global legalists
cling to a misguided conviction "that ordinary people or elites ...
will cause governments to comply with international law beyond what is in the government's narrow
self-interest."4 The evidence, Posner insists, suggests otherwise. Posner notes how
even the high-profile efforts of human rights NGOs are often countered by wellheeled military or trade lobbies favouring putative infringements.
In part 1I of the book, Posner sets his crosshairs on the international judiciary.
He tracks the decline of the International Court of Justice to developing nations'
growing clout on its roster. Given the leading powers' lack of a Security Councillike "veto," Posner argues, it was only natural that they turned to forums more
conducive to their interests-hence, for Posner, the proliferation of regional,
specialized institutions and arbitral practices. Against the post-World War II
successes of European law, Posner argues that international courts work only when
member-states see gains-in Europe's case, the stability and growth promised by
post-war integration. Absent such perceived benefits, he notes, the institutions
languish as states law-break at will. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights,
for instance, has only rendered fifteen judgments at Posner's count.
Posner, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, presents a lively,
provocative case for taking any "Whig history" account,' as he calls it, of international law's development with a grain of salt. In doing so, he builds on his earlier
rational-choice approach to the subject set out in 2006's The Limits ofInternational
Law.' Although Posner is not in uncharted territory in his scepticism-H.L.A.
Hart pointed to missing institutions as the critical "defect" in international law
five decades ago,7 and international relations "realists" have long bemoaned the
idealist pretensions of global institutions-the value of Posner's contribution lies
in connecting the legal angles lost to political scientists to the geopolitical ones
lost to lawyers. If Posner is right, a clear-sighted view of international law may
require one to be as versed in Chapter VII of the UN Charter as in Thucydides.
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